Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Twodimensional semantics: Twodimensional are semantics that take into account both the properties of a situation described by a statement and the properties of the utterance situation (which need not be identical with the described situation). For example, the statement that one is at location A, B or C is true when it is uttered at location A, B or C (diagonalization). Statements of a particular form are always true, e.g. "I am here now". In this case, the entire two-dimensional matrix is assigned the value "true". Two-dimensional semantics go back to D. Kaplan (D. Kaplan, Demonstratives, in Perry & Wettstein (Eds.) Themes from Kaplan, Oxford, 1989, pp. 481-563). See also context/context dependency, diagonalization, diagonal propositions, A-intensions, C-intensions, Stalnaker intensions, character, content._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Frank Jackson on Twodimensional Semantics - Dictionary of Arguments
Stalnaker I 204 Two-dimensional framework/Jackson/Stalnaker: with the two-dimensional framework one can reduce necessity a posteriori as Jackson and Chalmers have done. This solves the problem of intentionality. (> Metaphysics/Jackson). Stalnaker: I will show the two ways to interpret this framework: A) semantically B) metasemantically._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Jackson I Frank C. Jackson From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis Oxford 2000 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 |
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> Counter arguments against Jackson
> Counter arguments in relation to Twodimensional Semantics
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-27